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Peacebuilding Programs and the Philosophical Frameworks of Evaluation: A Conceptual Discussion
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| Presenter(s):
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| Terrence Jantzi,
Eastern Mennonite University,
jantzit@emu.edu
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| Abstract:
Over the past decade, the field of Peacebuilding has emerged as a recognized discipline. However, there is still considerable debate within the field concerning how to do evaluations of Peacebuilding initiatives. This paper presents a conceptual reflection intended to spark conversation concerning the location of peacebuilding within the philosophical and theoretical landscape of evaluation. The paper provides a description of the spectrum of philosophical frameworks in evaluation highlighting their embedded assumptions and a description of the spectrum of purposes of evaluation. These spectrums are then used to provide a reflection on the philosophical frameworks and evaluation purposes most closely aligned with the assumptions and practices found in contemporary Peacebuilding practice. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of these reflections for designing appropriate peacebuilding evaluations.
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Valuing and Evaluation: Steps to a Framework in Support of Effective Evaluation Policy
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| Presenter(s):
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| Jennifer Grewe,
Utah State University,
jenngrewe@gmail.com
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| Rod Hammer,
Utah State University,
rodhammer@cc.usu.edu
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| Lindsey Thurgood,
Utah State University,
lindsey.thurgood@usu.edu
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| George Julnes,
Utah State University,
george.julnes@usu.edu
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| Abstract:
Much attention has been given lately to controversies over methods for supporting causal conclusions (Julnes & Rog, 2007). Indeed, these controversies are a major reason that AEA has established a standing committee for evaluation policy and has chosen evaluation policy as the theme for this year’s conference. A related controversy, though with less attention, involves how we make judgments of value about the policies and programs that we evaluate. While scholars like Scriven insist that value judgments are necessary for inquiry to be evaluation, there is little consensus within the evaluation community on either the importance of valuation or, when needed, how to do it.
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The Goal Versus the Gold Standard
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| Presenter(s):
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| James Griffith,
Claremont Graduate University,
james.griffith@cgu.edu
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| Abstract:
The current paper argues for an epistemological stance in evaluation that connects to current movements in contemporary Philosophy. Contemporary philosophical discussions of such ancient questions as ‘When can we be certain?’ ‘When is knowledge secure?’ ‘When do we have enough evidence?’ have obvious and meaningful application in contemporary evaluation practice.
Gettier’s (1963) refutation of analyses of knowledge as justified, true, belief thrust philosophers into decades of attempts to rethink justification or discover some additional element that, added to justified true belief would yield knowledge. Some contemporary philosophers have turned in a new direction referred to variably as interest-relative, means-end, or practical interest epistemology. While this view is certainly not universally accepted in philosophy, this turn toward a practical orientation to knowledge in what is arguably the pure research discipline is informative for evaluation, where theorists have taken pains to distinguish evaluation from pure research, citing evaluation’s action orientation.
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