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Ensuring Quality in Evaluation by Generating Credible Judgment
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| Presenter(s):
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| Marthe Hurteau, University of Quebec at Montreal, hurteau.marthe@uqam.ca
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| Sylvain Houle, University of Quebec at Montreal, houle.sylvain@uqam.ca
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| Pascal NDinga, University of Quebec at Montreal, ndinga.pascal@uqam.ca
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| Michael Schleifer, University of Quebec at Montreal, schleifer.michael@uqam.ca
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| Véronique Lemieux, University of Quebec at Montreal, veronique.lemieux@gmail.com
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| Marie-Pier Marchand, University of Quebec at Montreal, mariepiermarchand@hotmail.com
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| Abstract:
“Evaluation is fundamentally about judging the value of something” (Rog). If credible evidence is a required element of quality, and is necessary to generate credible judgment, it’s still not enough (Schwandt). In a former study, Hurteau & Boissiroy (2009) have established that “argumentation” (harmonizing information and developing rigorous reasoning in order to produce statements and judgments) is an essential element, but poorly developed in the literature. The present research explored this concept by interviewing 25 various professionals that are generating a judgment in their practice. They were asked to describe and compare two situations: a successful and an unsuccessful one. The data analyzed will allow the emerging of a model to generate relevant argumentation to support a judgment. Focus groups with experienced program evaluators are establishing the transferability of this model to the specific context of program evaluation. The results will be presented.
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The Goal Standard, and Knowing Enough for Quality Evaluation
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| Presenter(s):
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| James Griffith, Claremont Graduate University, james.griffith@cgu.edu
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| Abstract:
The current paper argues for an epistemological stance in evaluation that connects to current movements in contemporary Philosophy. Contemporary philosophical discussions of such ancient questions as ‘When can we be certain?’ ‘When is knowledge secure?’ ‘When do we have enough evidence?’ have obvious and meaningful application in contemporary evaluation practice.
Gettier’s (1963) refutation of analyses of knowledge as justified, true, belief thrust philosophers into decades of attempts to rethink justification or discover some additional element that, added to justified true belief would yield knowledge. Some contemporary philosophers have turned in a new direction referred to variably as interest-relative, means-end, or practical interest epistemology. While this view is certainly not universally accepted in philosophy, this turn toward a practical orientation to knowledge in what is arguably the pure research discipline is informative for evaluation, where theorists have taken pains to distinguish evaluation from pure research, citing evaluation’s action orientation.
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